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Abstract 
Throughout 2016, Attorney-General George Brandis QC repeatedly denied he intended to 
leave the Federal Parliament and take up a position on the High Court of Australia. In this 
article we explore the experiences of the two most recent politicians-cum-High Court 
Justices: Garfield Barwick and Lionel Murphy; and note that Australia’s current judicial 
appointment process would have permitted Brandis to make a similar transition. We argue 
that this process should be revamped to enhance transparency and accountability in the 
appointments process, to the benefit of our judicial system and its public perception.  
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On 29 November 2016, Attorney-General George Brandis announced that the Governor-
General had accepted the advice of the government and would appoint Justice Susan Kiefel 
Australia’s thirteenth Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, while Justice James 
Edelman would fill the vacancy created by this appointment. Unsurprisingly, as Justice Kiefel 
is a fine jurist, and as she will become Australia’s first female chief justice, this 
announcement received considerable and uniformly positive attention. In making this 
announcement, however, Brandis also put to rest a recurrent rumour in Canberra and across 
the legal profession: that Brandis himself might move to the Court. Indeed, throughout 2016, 
Brandis was repeatedly forced to rule out accepting a judicial appointment before the end of 
his six-year Senate term. As late as September 2016, in response to questions from Senate 
colleagues, Brandis explained that he couldn’t ‘help but be flattered’, but continued to deny 
that he had had discussions with the Prime Minister or other members of Cabinet regarding 
a possible judicial appointment, or that he would accept any potential appointment.1 
                                                      
1 See, eg, Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 15 September 2016, 1077.  
Nonetheless, the rumours persisted, and a potential transition to the High Court was 
intermittently, though frequently, raised by journalists.2 
 
Such an appointment would not be entirely out of the question. Since Federation, six 
Commonwealth Attorneys-General have served on the Court: Henry Higgins (1906-1929), 
Isaac Isaacs (1906-1931), HV Evatt (1930-1940), John Latham (1935-1952), Garfield 
Barwick (1964-1981), and Lionel Murphy (1975-1986). Only Evatt, however, was appointed 
to the court before moving into federal politics: he would resign from the High Court in 1940 
to pursue this later career. Nonetheless, between 1906 and 1986, there was a former 
Commonwealth Attorney-General on the bench for all but 12 years. Since 1986, however, no 
Attorney-General has been appointed – a gap of over 30 years. What accounts for this 
apparent shift?  
 
In an article in the Alternative Law Journal in early 2016, Douglas McDonald explored the 
more general question of appointing former politicians as judges.3 McDonald noted that, 
while a risk exists that judges without legislative experience may not appreciate the 
compromises inherent to lawmaking and might therefore fail to appropriately understand 
legislative intent in statutory interpretation, changes within the legal profession, politics, and 
public perceptions have ‘fuel[led] … scepticism’ over the appropriateness of such 
transitions.4 We agree with this assessment, but suggest that any perception of impropriety 
is compounded when the judicial position in question is on Australia’s highest court. 
However, while many within the legal profession believe that ‘a significant political career 
should be a barrier’ to appointment as a High Court judge,5 and trends suggest that such 
appointment ‘may now be a thing of the past’,6 the judicial appointment process in Australia 
leaves open such a decision.  
 
Our essay complements McDonald’s article by taking a deeper look at the experiences of 
the two most recent politicians-cum-High Court judges: Sir Garfield Barwick and Lionel 
Murphy. This study will emphasise the central problem when appointing politicians to the 
High Court: that their partisan or political modes of behaviour, which make them highly 
                                                      
2 See, eg, Michael Pelly, ‘A chief justice George Brandis? Another High Court hallucination’, The Australian 
(online), 17 June 2016 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/a-chief-justice-george-brandis-
another-high-court-hallucination/news-story/e0bbb4df2f2c9c6f5f56e9b367f093b1. 
3 Douglas McDonald, ‘Worlds Apart: The appointment of former politicians as judges’ (2016) 41 Alternative 
Law Journal 17. 
4 Ibid 20.  
5 Queensland Supreme Court Justice J B Thomas cited in Peter Durack and Amelia Simpson, ‘Attorneys-
General’ in Michael Coper, Tony Blackshield and George Williams (eds), The Oxford Companion to the High 
Court of Australia (OUP, 2001)  
6 Durack and Simpson, above n 5.  
effective political creatures, disrupt perceptions of judicial independence and damage the 
High Court as an institution. While the debates that dogged Barwick, Murphy, and their 
places on the Court, are perhaps intimately connected to their own idiosyncrasies, in other 
respects the problems they brought to the bench predate those issues, stemming from their 
careers as politicians.  
 
Having explored these two cases, we then shift tack, examining the process of judicial 
appointment to the High Court of Australia, asking whether Brandis or a future Attorney-
General could appoint themselves to the Court.  We note that the extremely limited criteria 
for, and strict executive control over, appointments, leaves Australia increasingly isolated 
globally. More significantly however, as was made painfully clear recently in Queensland,7 
leaving appointment entirely in the hands of the executive carries risks that an appointee 
may once again shake public faith in the Court. 
 
Sir Garfield Barwick: The course upon which Your Excellency has determined … 
 
The penultimate Commonwealth Attorney-General appointed to the High Court of Australia 
was the Honourable Sir Garfield Edward John Barwick,8 taking over as Chief Justice on 1 
May 1964 following the retirement of Sir Owen Dixon. Having served under Liberal Prime 
Minister Sir Robert Menzies since 1958, the conservative Barwick reportedly remarked that 
no current barristers or jurists could replace Dixon, and that ‘“only the two of us, Menzies 
and myself” might meet the requirement’.9 Perhaps the most contentious role he ever played 
was as Chief Justice, contributing advice on a ‘non-justiciable’ matter to Governor-General 
Sir John Kerr during ‘the most dramatic event in Australia’s political history … a monumental 
train wreck’10 that remains one of the bitterest dividing lines in Australian public life: the 
dismissal. 
 
The dismissal of Gough Whitlam’s government on 11 November 1975, and the slow-drip of 
revelations since, have long fascinated commentators as well as the wider public. Although 
Kerr’s forewarning to Opposition Leader Malcolm Fraser,11 and the involvement of then-
                                                      
7 See, eg, Andrew Lynch, Gabrielle Appleby and Rebecca Ananian-Welsh, The Tim Carmody Affair: 
Australia’s Greatest Judicial Crisis (NewSouth, 2016).  
8 Though note that Barwick ceased to serve as Attorney-General several weeks prior to his appointment (while 
retaining office as Minister for External Affairs until three days prior to taking office). 
9 Paul Kelly and Troy Bramston, The Dismissal (Penguin Australia, 2015) 81. 
10 Ibid ix. 
11 Ibid 18. 
Justice Anthony Mason12 have renewed interest over time, the possibly decisive (not to 
mention enthusiastic)13 involvement of Barwick, who was politically hostile to Whitlam, has 
never been hidden from the public. At the core of the dismissal was Kerr’s belief that he 
could use the Crown’s reserve powers to dismiss a government that was unable to secure 
supply. Kerr was confirmed in his thinking by the authoritative support of Barwick,14 first as 
an informal counsellor and then through written advice that validated ‘the course upon which 
Your Excellency has determined [as] consistent with [the Governor-General’s] constitutional 
authority and duty.’15 This would ultimately benefit Barwick’s former political party who went 
on to form a new government under Malcolm Fraser. 
 
In the subsequent forty years since these events, Barwick’s role casts a long shadow on the 
thinking and self-identity of the High Court, both as an institution and amongst its constituent 
justices. Barwick had been a famed advocate with close relations to Menzies, his 
government and the Liberal Party, able to regularly ‘[give] advice to lawyers and politicians. 
Instructing them was his second nature and it had made him rich and famous.’16 A later 
Chief Justice, Murray Gleeson, best summarised the unusual quality of Barwick and how his 
past career affected his time on the bench: ‘[he] had been a prominent politician [with] 
political involvement and political associations. The relationship… between Barwick and 
Menzies, would have been entirely different from any relationship I ever had with a prime 
minister.’17 Additionally his personality combined self-assurance (to the point of arrogance)18 
with an argumentative style that could be viewed as wilfully antagonistic.19 These 
characteristics made him a very successful barrister, as well as a frontbench parliamentarian 
who aspired to replace the long-serving Menzies.20 At the same time, such a personality, 
with its political involvement and disapproval of Whitlam, also made him a perfect foil for 
Kerr, who recent writers have suggested was manipulating Barwick to be a protective cover 
for the ensuing scandal.21 
 
                                                      
12 Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Conversations with Sir John Kerr relating to his termination of the commission of the 
Prime Minister (the Hon E G Whitlam AC QC) on 11 November 1975’ (Statement, 23 August 2012). 
13 Sir Garfield Barwick, Sir John Did his Duty (Serendip Publications, 1983) 94. 
14 David Marr, Barwick (George Allen & Unwin, 1980) 266–76; Kelly and Bramston, above n 9, 38–9. 
15 Formal advice from Chief Justice Sir Garfield Barwick to Governor-General Sir John Kerr, 10 November 
1975 in Kerr Papers (National Archives of Australia) 1. 
16 Kelly and Bramston, above n 9, 41. 
17 Ibid 40. 
18 Garfield Barwick, A Radical Tory (Federation Press, 1995) 96–7. 
19 Kelly and Bramston, above n 9, 80. 
20 Marr, above n 14, 204. 
21 Kelly and Bramston, above n 9, 41. 
Indeed, the substantial partisan backlash against Kerr is surprisingly more unified in 
criticising Barwick,22 and generates ongoing discomfort for the separation of powers. One of 
the best accusations levelled at Barwick himself is by then-Justice Lionel Murphy, who 
feared that his actions tarred the High Court with an ‘extreme degree of political partisanship’ 
because it was ‘seriously prejudicial to one side in the political controversy.’23 Barwick 
however was unrepentant, defensive and consistent: he would dismiss the political aspects 
of his role up until his death.24 As a result, it is unsurprising Barwick’s ‘more recent 
successors have asserted that any comparable event is inconceivable or at least most 
unlikely’,25 adopting an informal post-Barwick rule of impartiality that enjoys support even 
today.26 In a eulogy for Barwick on 5 August 1997, then-Chief Justice Sir Gerald Brennan 
articulated this rule by stating that Barwick’s behaviour ‘was, and remains, a controversial 
matter but, if only on that account, will not happen again.’27  
 
While a constitutional crisis similar to the dismissal may never again occur thanks to this 
policy, informal rules may not be sufficient to preclude another partisan from dragging the 
High Court back into the disrepute of polarising politics. The possibility of another Attorney-
General being appointed to the High Court remains entirely viable, and the potential for that 
appointee to conflict on contentious matters the ruling government is perhaps heightened in 
our current political culture where political leadership is prone to unprecedented turnover. 
Despite the argument that our judicial and political cultures are now substantially different to 
the 1970s, a sufficiently motivated government, under public pressure or requiring an 
expedient reshuffle, may find it useful to readopt this kind of appointment and subject the 
High Court to a comparable controversy once more. Of course, appointing a politician (or 
Attorney-General) is not prima facie problematic but better oversight mechanisms are 
required. Particularly, given that Barwick is defended to this day, a future justice with both a 
similar legal pedigree and party connections could reasonably point to his behaviour as their 
own precedent to justify controversy. 
 
 
Lionel Murphy and his ‘little mate’ 
 
                                                      
22 Marr, above n 14, 271, 289. 
23 Letter from Justice Lionel Murphy to Chief Justice Sir Garfield Barwick, 13 November 1975. 
24 See Barwick, above n 13 and above n 18. 
25 Kelly and Bramston, above n 9, 38. 
26 Ibid 39. 
27 Chief Justice Sir Gerard Brennan, ‘The Late Sir Garfield Barwick’ (Eulogy of Sir Garfield Barwick, 5 August 
1997). 
The most recent Attorney-General to join Australia’s highest Bench was Senator the 
Honourable Lionel Keith Murphy. Murphy left the Whitlam Government on 10 February 1975, 
with his appointment catalysing a Senate, and then parliamentary, deadlock leading to the 
dismissal. To this day, Murphy continues to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as ‘the most 
divisive figure in the history of the Senate.’28 From his start as a successful industrial 
barrister, Murphy was an unashamedly progressive,29 partisan30 and reform-minded31 public 
figure. Murphy entered the Senate in August 1962, leading Labor’s caucus there from 
February 1967, and joining the Cabinet as Attorney-General following Whitlam’s 1972 
entrance into office. Throughout his political life, Murphy’s eloquence, intellect, decisiveness 
and disregard for caution resulted in many legislative achievements, but also resentment 
and political miscalculations that hurt his personal reputation and the Labor Government he 
served.32 From the announcement of his appointment to the High Court, Murphy was 
attacked and accused of being unsuitable for office: the media,33 the Melbourne bar34 and 
Chief Justice Barwick35 in particular all made little effort to hide their displeasure. 
 
Ultimately, however, Murphy’s judicial career would be undermined not by his adversaries, 
but by an old political friend. The convoluted scandal, involving illegal wiretaps, two Senate 
committee investigations, back-and-forth criminal proceedings and a seemingly-unending 
series of accusations, flowed from Murphy’s interaction with, and interventions on behalf of, 
Morgan Ryan, a Sydney solicitor with strong ties to NSW Labor and facing a string of 
criminal charges.36 This controversy, the last in a string that characterised Murphy’s career, 
dominated his final years between February 1984 and his death from cancer on 21 October 
1986. It asked whether Murphy had ever engaged in any ‘proved misbehaviour’ that, under 
section 72 of the Constitution, would provide parliament the grounds for his removal as a 
judge. The subsequent constitutional crisis that arose was a direct result of Murphy’s refusal 
to leave the bench, even as evidence was adduced that suggested he had tried to influence 
multiple decisions that might have harmed Ryan.37 One of the best descriptions of this period 
                                                      
28 Geoffrey Browne, MURPHY, Lionel Keith (1922-1986) (18 October 2016) The Biographical Dictionary of 
the Australian Senate http://biography.senate.gov.au/index.php/murphy-lionel-keith/. 
29 VG Venturini, ‘Introduction’ in VG Venturini (ed), Five Voices for Lionel (Federation Press, 1994) xi, xiv. 
30 The Hon Clyde Cameron AO, ‘He lost consciousness before he lost hope’ (Speech delivered at the Third 
Annual Lionel Murphy Memorial Lecture, Morwell Civic Centre Kernot Hall, 19 October 1989). 
31 Brian Galligan, ‘Murphy, Lionel Keith (1922-1986)’ in Melanie Nolan (ed), Australian Dictionary of 
Biography (Melbourne University Publishing, 2012) vol 18. 
32 Browne, above n 28. 
33 ‘A Clear Case of Justice Not Being Seen to be Done’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) 11 February 
1975, 6; Peter Samuel, ‘The Final Murphy Time-Bomb’, The Bulletin (Sydney) 15 February 1975, 16. 
34 Jenny Hocking, Lionel Murphy: A Political Biography (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 226. 
35 Ibid 231. 
36 Frank Bongiorno, The Eighties: The Decade That Transformed Australia (Black Inc, 2015) 100–1. 
37 See Hocking, above n 34, 297 (for allegations by Chief Stipendiary Magistrate Clarrie Briese), 299 (for 
allegations by Justice Paul Flannery), 325–6 (allegations by Senator Jim McClelland); also Browne, above n 28 
is that it represents ‘the Labor Party’s contribution to official corruption’ in the 1980s,38 a 
decade often characterised by excess and amorality. 
 
The two-year affair divided the High Court, the Hawke government of the time, and the wider 
public, because it crystallised misgivings over the ‘mutual back-scratching’ of ‘mates’ within 
politics and the law.39 Murphy’s own use of the term (‘And now, what about my little mate?’)40 
seemed to exemplify a culture whose  
 
critics … associated it with the exclusion and oppression of women, gay men, 
Aboriginal Australians and ethnic minorities, and a blind loyalty between men that 
was careless of ethics and the law.41  
 
Murphy’s defensiveness and refusal to be questioned highlighted a seeming indifference to 
the independence expected of High Court justices, instead confirming a clear belief that 
meddling on behalf of ‘the old mates’ network would override any considerations of 
propriety’.42 As further activity was revealed and the political drama continued, serious 
questions were raised about the separation of powers, public confidence and even the 
everyday functioning of the High Court. As late as July 1986, Chief Justice Sir Harry Gibbs 
excluded Murphy from the High Court and refused to let him sit as a justice.43 Murphy’s 
humiliation was eventually wound up with no clear resolution once his cancer diagnosis 
became widely known,44 allowing him to return to the bench for one week and have his final 
judgments handed down an hour before his death.  
 
The notorious coda of Murphy’s life would have likely been celebrated had he remained a 
career politician, where the accusations could be better characterised as a political witch-
hunt. Instead, his final insistence on remaining a High Court justice so long as he had ‘the 
security of tenure which section 72 of the Constitution is supposed to ensure’ corroded the 
High Court’s public standing through a ‘cumulative … aura of impropriety’45 and led leaders 
                                                      
(allegations that Murphy attempted to bribe a police officer in 1979 and allegations by the Stewart Royal 
Commission into Drug Trafficking). 
38 Bongiorno, above n 36, 100. 
39 Ibid 102. 
40 Wendy Bacon, ‘Behind the Murphy Affair’, National Times (Sydney), 31 August – 6 September 2016, 6. 
41 Bongiorno, above n 36, 102. 
42 Gillian Appleton, Diamond Cuts: An Affectionate Memoir of Jim McClelland (MacMillan, 2000) 221–5. 
43 Gareth Evans, Inside the Hawke-Keating Government: A Cabinet Diary (Melbourne University Press, 2015) 
317-18. 
44 AR Blackshield, ‘The “Murphy Affair”’ in Jocelynne Scutt (ed), Lionel Murphy: A Radical Judge 
(McCulloch Publishing, 1987) 230, 256. 
45 Ibid. 
in his own party to scorn him as ‘a professional martyr’.46 Murphy’s combative and 
outspoken nature, as well as his close-knit circle of ‘mates’, had made him a powerful 
factional warlord in politics, but the kinds of behaviour that supported that kind of success 
should not have accompanied him in his transition to the Judiciary. His example clearly 
serves as a warning to others, and may have even attracted its own informal rule of 
executive appointment and/or judicial activity,47 but as with the Barwick case, that is all it is: 
unspoken and unenforceable. As far as Australia’s separated institutions are concerned, the 
potential damage of another drawn-out controversy remain – so long as contentious, or 
overtly political, figures can be placed into that least political arm of Australia’s government. 
 
The judicial appointment process 
 
While Barwick and Murphy’s time on the Bench may have led to a political calculation that 
Commonwealth Attorneys-General should no longer make a similar transition, there is no 
explicit prohibition. In fact, the eligibility criteria for Justices of the High Court of Australia are 
minimal, leaving significant scope for executive choice and, at times (as seen above), 
allegations of political patronage. Section 72 of the Constitution sets out a single qualification 
requirement – a person must be younger than 70 years of age. The High Court of Australia 
Act 1979 (Cth) fills in a few more details: section 7 provides that a person must not be 
appointed unless she or he is or has been a Judge of a federal, state or territory Court, or 
has been on the rolls of the High Court, or of the Supreme Court of a state or territory for not 
less than five years, and section 10 prevents a justice from accepting or holding any other 
office of profit within Australia. 
 
The procedure of appointment is set out only in skeletal form under statute.  Section 5 
provides that the Justices are ‘appointed by the Governor-General’, though the decision is in 
fact made by Cabinet on the recommendation of the Attorney-General. Under section 6, the 
Attorney-General is required to ‘consult’ with their state counterparts in relation to the 
appointment. Even in circumstances where the position of Attorney-General is held by an 
individual who does not rely on a ‘fanciful definition’ of this word,48 there is no requirement 
                                                      
46 Hocking, above n 34, 293. 
47 Brendan Lim believes that absent some major shifts in constitutional culture, we will not see another 
controversial politician appointed to the Court: Brendan Lim, Australia’s Constitution After Whitlam 
(Cambridge University Press, 2017) 126.  
48 Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee, Nature and Scope of the Consultations Prior to the 
Making of the Legal Services Amendment (Solicitor-General Opinions) Direction 2016 (Commonwealth of 
Australia, November 2016) 27 [4.12]. 
that the Attorney-General listen to their state counterparts, and there is no statement of 
criteria against which to assess candidates.  
 
Reflecting on the limited statutory constraints, Gabrielle Appleby has noted that it is 
‘inevitable’ that politics will infiltrate the appointment process.49 To some degree this is 
positive. As James Allen has remarked, the executive’s wide scope ensures some minimal 
level of democratic accountability is maintained over judicial appointments.50 However, in 
light of the dangers of partisanship, and developments internationally, the extremely broad 
discretionary powers granted to Australian federal Attorneys General in the appointment of 
judges, is difficult to maintain.51 Indeed, Australia appears increasingly isolated.   
 
In August 2016, Canada revamped its federal judicial appointment process by establishing 
an independent and non-partisan advisory appointments board, tasked with identifying 
suitable candidates, and increasing transparency around nominations. Most significantly, 
instead of relying on the ‘judicial whisper’,52 candidates seeking a federal judicial 
appointment must submit an application, which is then considered by the Advisory Board. 
The Advisory Board is composed of seven members, four of whom are nominated by 
independent professional organisations. These seven members review the candidate 
applications and submit a shortlist of three to five individuals for consideration by the Prime 
Minister. This new process is designed to enhance the integrity of the Supreme Court by 
increasing transparency in the appointments process. As such: 
 
the assessment criteria guiding the Advisory Board, the questionnaire that all 
applicants must answer, and certain answers provided to the questionnaire by 
the Prime Minister’s eventual nominee, will all be made public.53 
 
                                                      
49 Gabrielle Appleby, ‘Appointing Australia’s highest judges deserves proper scrutiny’, The Conversation, 9 
December 2014 https://theconversation.com/appointing-australias-highest-judges-deserves-proper-scrutiny-
35039.  
50 James Allen, ‘Is Talk of the Quality of Judging Sometimes Strained, Feigned or not Sustained’ in Jonathan 
Crowe and Rebecca Ananian-Welsh (eds), Judicial Independence in Australia: Contemporary Challenges, 
Future Directions (Federation Press, 2016) 64, 72. 
51 Harry Hobbs, ‘Finding a fair reflection on the High Court of Australia’ (2015) 40 Alternative Law Journal 13, 
16. 
52 Elizabeth Handsley, ‘“The Judicial Whisper Goes Around”: Appointment of Judicial Officers in Australia’ in 
Kate Malleson and Peter Russell (eds), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power (University of Toronto 
Press, 2006) 123.   
53 Prime Minister of Canada, ‘Prime Minister announces new Supreme Court of Canada judicial appointments 
process’, 2 August 2016 http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2016/08/02/prime-minister-announces-new-supreme-court-
canada-judicial-appointments-process. 
Additionally, members of Parliament are able to take part in a question and answer session 
with the nominee, before she or he is appointed. On 2 December 2016, Justice Malcolm 
Rowe became the first person appointed to the Court under this new procedure. 
Significantly, Justice Rowe’s professional career includes time as head of the Newfoundland 
and Labrador civil service of Newfoundland under a provincial Liberal government,54 
demonstrating that formalising appointment processes need not reduce professional 
diversity, or individuals with knowledge of government. Parts of Justice Rowe’s application 
are available online,55 giving a revealing insight into his judicial philosophy.  
 
In the UK, the Judicial Appointments Commission has existed since 2006. This independent 
body, rather than the Lord Chancellor, is responsible for the selection of candidates for 
judicial office. All positions are advertised against open and accessible selection criteria, and 
candidates are required to apply for consideration.56 The same process occurs in South 
Africa, where the Judicial Services Commission, an independent body constituted by the 
South African Constitution, recommends people for appointment. The Commission calls for 
nominations and holds public interviews, before drawing up a list of nominees (the list must 
have at least three more names than the number of vacancies). From this list, the President, 
after consultation with the Chief Justice and the leaders of political parties represented in the 





The processes in Canada, the UK and South Africa all maintain the same minimum level of 
democratic accountability that exists under our arrangement. They also all ensure that the 
final decision is made by the government of the day. What distinguishes them, however, is 
the emphasis on transparency and accountability. These processes do not prevent a 
politician, or in Justice Rowe’s case – an individual who has benefited from the patronage of 
one particular party – from being appointed to the bench, but in providing a layer of scrutiny 
and transparency that does not exist in Australia they ensure that the independence of the 
Court is less likely to be called into question. While the experiences of Barwick and Murphy 
                                                      
54 Tonda Maccharles, ‘Trudeau names Malcolm Rowe as first Newfoundland judge on Supreme Court of 
Canada’, The Star, 17 October 2016 https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/10/17/trudeau-names-malcolm-
rowe-as-the-first-newfoundland-judge-to-the-supreme-court-of-canada.html. 
55 Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs Canada, ‘The Honourable Malcom Rowe’s 
questionnaire’, 16 December 2016 http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/scc-csc/nominee-candidat-eng.html.  
56 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (UK) (c4) ss 63. 
57 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1996 (South Africa) ss 174–8. 
mean that it is unlikely that a future government will appoint a Commonwealth Attorney-
General to the High Court, it remains possible. This would be a delicate exercise without a 
new, transparent and accountable judicial appointments process.  
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